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Abstract
This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called ‘scoring rules’ after
their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the
collective judgments which reach the highest total ‘score’ across the individuals, subject
to the judgments having to be rational. Depending on how we deﬁne ‘scores’, we obtain
several (old and new) solutions to the judgment aggregation problem, such as distance-
based aggregation, premise- and conclusion-based aggregation, truth-tracking rules, and
a Borda-type rule. Scoring rules are shown to generalize the classical scoring rules of
preference aggregation theory.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D70, D71
Keywords: judgment aggregation, social choice, scoring rules, Hamming rule, Borda rule,
premise- and conclusion-based rules
1 Introduction
The judgment aggregation problem consists in merging many individuals’ yes/no judgments
on some interconnected propositions into collective yes/no judgments on these propositions.
The classical example, born in legal theory, is that three jurors in a court trial disagree on
which of the following three propositions are true: the defendant has broken the contract
(p); the contract is legally valid (q); the defendant is liable (r). According to a univer-
sally accepted legal doctrine, r (the ‘conclusion’) is true if and only if p and r (the two
‘premises’) are both true. So, r is logically equivalent to p ∧ q. The simplest rule to ag-
gregate the jurors’ judgments — namely propositionwise majority voting — may generate
logically inconsistent collective judgments, as Table 1 illustrates. There are of course nu-
premise p premise q conclusion r (⇔ p ∧ q)
Individual 1 Yes Yes Yes
Individual 2 Yes No No
Individual 3 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
Table 1: The classical example of logically inconsistent majority judgments
merous other possible ‘agendas’, i.e., kinds of interconnected propositions a group might
face. Preference aggregation is a special case with propositions of the form ‘x is better than
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y’ (for many alternatives x and y), where these propositions are interconnected through
standard conditions such as transitivity. In this context, Condorcet’s classical voting para-
dox about cyclical majority preferences is nothing but another example of inconsistent
majority judgments. Starting with List and Pettit’s (2002) seminal paper, a whole series
of contributions have explored which judgment aggregation rules can be used, depending
on, ﬁrstly, the agenda in question, and, secondly, the requirements placed on aggregation,
such as anonymity, and of course the consistency of collective judgments. Some theorems
generalize Arrow’s Theorem from preference to judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List
2007, Dokow and Holzman 2010; both build on Nehring and Puppe 2010a and strengthen
Wilson 1975). Other theorems have no immediate counterparts in classical social choice
theory (e.g., List 2004, Dietrich 2006a, 2010, Nehring and Puppe 2010b, Dietrich and
Mongin 2010).
It is fair to say that judgment aggregation theory has until recently been dominated
by ‘impossibility’ ﬁndings, as is evident from the Symposium on Judgment Aggregation in
Journal of Economic Theory (C. List and B. Polak eds., 2010, vol. 145(2)). The recent
conference ‘Judgment aggregation and voting’ (Freudenstadt, 2011) however marks a visible
shift of attention towards constructing concrete aggregation rules and ﬁnding ‘second best’
solutions in the face of impossibility results. The new proposals range from a ﬁrst Borda-
type aggregation rule (Zwicker 2011) to, among others, new distance-based rules (Duddy
and Piggins 2011) and rules which approximate the majority judgments when these are
inconsistent (Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2011). The more traditional proposals include
premise- and conclusion-based rules (e.g., Kornhauser and Sager 1986, Pettit 2001, List &
Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2006, Dietrich and Mongin 2010), sequential rules (e.g., List 2004,
Dietrich and List 2007b), distance-based rules (e.g., Konieszni and Pino-Perez 2002, Pigozzi
2006, Miller and Osherson 2008, Eckert and Klamler 2009), and quota rules with well-
calibrated acceptance thresholds and varous degrees of collective rationality (e.g., Dietrich
and List 2007b; see also Nehring and Puppe 2010a).
The present paper contributes to the theory’s current ‘constructive’ eﬀort by investi-
gating a class of aggregation rules to be called scoring rules. The inspiration comes from
classical scoring rules in preference aggregation theory. These rules generate collective pref-
erences which rank each alternative according to the sum-total ‘score’ it receives from the
group members, where the ‘score’ could be deﬁned in diﬀerent ways, leading to diﬀerent
classical scoring rules such as Borda rule (see Smith 1973, Young 1975, and for abstract
generalizations Myerson 1995, Zwicker 2008 and Pivato 2011b). In a general judgment
aggregation framework, however, there are no ‘alternatives’; so our scoring rules are based
on assigning scores to propositions, not alternatives. Nonetheless, our scoring rules are
related to classical scoring rules, and generalize them, as will be shown.
The paradigm underlying our scoring rules — i.e., the maximization of total score of
collective judgments — diﬀers from standard paradigms in judgment aggregation, such as
the premise-, conclusion- or distance-based paradigms. Nonetheless, it will turn out that
several existing rules can be re-modelled as scoring rules, and can thus be ‘rationalized’ in
terms of the maximization of total scores. Of course, the way scores are being assigned
to propositions — the ‘scoring’ — diﬀers strongly across rules; for instance, the Hamming
rule and the premise-based rule can each be viewed as a scoring rule, but with respect
to two very diﬀerent scorings. This paper explores various plausible scorings. It uncovers
the scorings which implicitly underlie several well-known aggregation rules, and suggests
other scorings which generate novel aggregation rules. For instance, a particularly natural
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scoring, to be called reversal scoring, will lead to a new generalization of Borda rule from
preference aggregation to judgment aggregation. The problem of how to generalize Borda
rule has been a long-lasting open question in judgment aggregation theory. Recently, an
interesting, though so far incomplete, proposal was made by Zwicker (2011) (who told me
that also Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins have independent work in progress about this).
Surprisingly, Zwicker’s and the present Borda generalizations are distinctively diﬀerent.
Though large, the class of scoring rules is far from universal: some important aggrega-
tion rules fall outside this class (notably the mentioned rule approximating the majority
judgments, by Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2011). I will also investigate a natural general-
ization of scoring rules, to be called set scoring rules, which are based on assigning scores
to entire judgment sets rather than single propositions (judgments). Set scoring rules are
for instance interesting in the context of epistemic (‘truth-tracking’) aggregation models,
where they have recently been studied by Pivato (2011a).
I could have written this paper by focusing exclusively on one speciﬁc application of
scoring rules (for instance, the problem of extending Borda rule). However, I chose to give
the paper a broader scope, not only to do justice to the diverse applications of scoring rules,
but also to be useful at the theory’s current stage of searching for concrete mechanisms. I
hope that the ideas and perspectives oﬀered below will be stimulating and inspiring.
After this introduction, Section 2 deﬁnes the general framework, Section 3 analyses
various scoring rules, Section 4 goes on to analyse several set scoring rules, and Section 5
draws some conclusions about where we stand in terms of concrete aggregation procedures.
2 Agenda, aggregation rules, and examples
I now introduce the framework, following List and Pettit (2002) and Dietrich (2007).2 We
consider a set of n (≥ 2) individuals, denoted N = {1, ..., n}. They need to decide which of
certain interconnected propositions to ‘believe’ or ‘accept’. The set of propositions under
consideration — the agenda — is closed under negation, which ensures that whenever, say,
‘it rains’ is a candidate for belief, so is ‘it does not rain’. The agenda is thus a (disjoint)
union of binary ‘issues’ {p,¬p} involving a proposition and its negation. Rationally, ex-
actly one proposition from each issue is accepted, and this in accordance with the logical
interconnections. Formally, the agenda is simply an arbitrary set X (whose elements we
call ‘propositions’) which is
• closed under negation: for every proposition p in X there is a speciﬁed proposition
denoted ¬p (‘not p’) in X such that ¬p = p = ¬¬p (i.e., such that X is partitioned
into binary issues {p,¬p});
• endowed with logical interconnections: there is a speciﬁcation of which subsets of X
are ‘consistent’, i.e., formally, there is a system C of subsets called ‘consistent’.
A ‘judgment set’ A ⊆ X is complete if it contains a member of each pair p,¬p ∈ X,
and (fully) rational if it is complete and consistent. The set of all rational judgment sets
is denote by D.3
2To be precise, I use a slimmer variant of their models: I do not explicitly introduce the logic L in which
propositions are formed.
3Our notion of an ‘agenda’ is very general. The propositions in X typically represent what an agent
may or may not believe; but alternatively, they could represent arbitrary attributes which an agent may
or may not possess such as the attribute of being rich (in which case ‘judgment sets’ are in fact ‘attribute
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As usual in the theory, we assume that the consistency notion is regular. Regularity can
be expressed by three conditions: no set {p,¬p} is consistent (C1, ‘self-entailment’); subsets
of consistent sets are consistent (C2, ‘monotonicity’); ∅ is consistent and each consistent
set can be extended to a complete and consistent set (C3, ‘completability’). Equivalently,
regularity can be expressed by a single condition: C = {C ⊆ A : A ∈ D} = ∅, i.e.,
the consistent sets are precisely the subsets of rational sets. The systems D and C are
thus interdeﬁnable, so that, given regularity, we could start from D instead of C as the
primitive.4
Further, let X be ﬁnite. Notationally, a judgment set A ⊆ X is often abbreviated
by concatenating its members in any order (so, p¬q¬r is short for {p,¬q,¬r}); and the
negation-closure of a set Y ⊆ X is denoted
Y ± ≡ {p,¬p : p ∈ Y }.
I now give two standard examples, to which I shall repeatedly refer.
Example 1: the standard ‘doctrinal paradox agenda’. The agenda is
X = {p, q, r}±.
Logical interconnections are deﬁned relative to the external constraint r↔ (p ∧ q). So,
D = {pqr, p¬q¬r,¬pq¬r,¬p¬q¬r}.
Example 2: the preference agenda. For an arbitrary, ﬁnite set of alternatives K, the
preference agenda is deﬁned as
X = XK = {xPy : x, y ∈ K,x = y},
where the negation of a proposition xPy is of course ¬xPy = yPx, and where logical
interconnections are deﬁned relative to the usual conditions of transitivity, asymmetry and
connectedness, which deﬁne a strict linear order. Formally, to each binary relation ≻ over
K uniquely corresponds a judgment set, denoted A≻ = {xPy ∈ X : x ≻ y}, and the set of
all rational judgment sets is
D = {A≻ : ≻ is a strict linear order over K}.
A (multi-valued) aggregation rule is a correspondence F which to every proﬁle of
‘individual’ judgment sets (A1, ..., An) (from some domain, usually Dn) assigns a set
sets’). The propositions could be thought of for instance as being syntactic objects (logical expressions)
or semantic objects (e.g., sets of worlds). It is often natural to regard the agenda X as a subset of a logic
L from which it inherits the negation operator and the logical interconnections. This logic is general: it
could for instance be standard propositional logic, standard predicate logic, or various modal or conditional
logics (see Dietrich 2007).
4 Instead of starting from the system of consistent sets C satisfying C1-C3 and deriving the system D of
rational judgment sets, we could equivalently have started from D (any non-empty system of sets containing
exactly one member from each pair p,¬p ∈ X) and derived the system C := ∪A∈D{C : C ⊆ A} (which
then automatically satisﬁes C1-C3). So, in algebraic terms, the agenda is deﬁnable either as the structure
(X,¬, C) or, equivalently, as the structure (X,¬,D). A future challenge is to relax the conditions C1-C3
by studying, e.g., judgment aggregation in non-monotonic logics (in which case C must be the primitive).
4
F (A1, ..., An) of ‘collective’ judgment sets. Typically, the output F (A1, ..., An) is a sin-
gleton set {C}, in which case we identify this set with C and write F (A1, ..., An) = C. If
F (A1, ..., An) contains more than one judgment set, there is a ‘tie’ between these judgment
sets. An aggregation rule is called single-valued or tie-free if it always generates a single
judgment set. A standard (single-valued) aggregation rule is majority rule; it is given by
F (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : p ∈ Ai for more than half of the individuals i}
and generates inconsistent collective judgment sets for many agendas and proﬁles. If both
individual and collective judgment sets are rational (i.e., in D), the aggregation rule deﬁnes
a correspondences Dn ⇒ D, and in the case of single-valuedness a function Dn →D.5
3 Scoring rules
Scoring rules are particular judgment aggregation rules, deﬁned on the basis of a so-called
scoring function. A scoring function — or simply a scoring — is a function s : X ×D → R
which to each proposition p and rational judgment set A assigns a number sA(p), called
the score of p given A and measuring how p performs (‘scores’) from the perspective of
holding judgment set A. As an elementary example, so-called simple scoring is given by:
sA(p) =

1 if p ∈ A
0 if p ∈ A, (1)
so that all accepted propositions score 1, whereas all rejected propositions score 0. This
and many other scorings will be analysed. Let us think of the score of a set of propositions
as the sum of the scores of its members. So, the scoring s is extended to a function which
(given the agent’s judgment set A ∈ D) assigns to each set C ⊆ X the score
sA(C) ≡

p∈C
sA(p).
A scoring s gives rise to an aggregation rule, called the scoring rule w.r.t. s and denoted
Fs. Given a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn, this rule determines the collective judgments by
selecting the rational judgment set(s) with the highest sum-total score across all judgments
and all individuals:
Fs(A1, ..., An) = judgment set(s) in D with highest total score
= argmaxC∈D

p∈C,i∈N
sAi(p) = argmaxC∈D

i∈N
sAi(C).
By a scoring rule simpliciter we of course mean an aggregation rule which is a scoring
rule w.r.t. some scoring. Diﬀerent scorings s and s′ can generate the same scoring rule
Fs = Fs′ , in which case they are called equivalent. For instance, s is equivalent to s′ = 2s.6
5More generally, dropping the requirement of collective rationality, we have a correspondence Dn ⇒ 2X ,
where 2X is the set of all judgment sets, rational or not. As usual, I write ‘⇒’ instead of ‘→’ to indicate
a multi -function.
6More generally, certain increasing transformations have no eﬀect. As one may show, scorings s and s′
are equivalent (i.e., Fs = Fs′) whenever there are coeﬃcients a > 0 and bp ∈ R (p ∈ X) with bp = b¬p for
all p ∈ X such that s′ is given by s′A(p) = asA(p) + bp.
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3.1 Simple scoring and the Hamming rule
We ﬁrst consider the most elementary deﬁnition of scoring, namely simple scoring (1).
Table 2 illustrates the corresponding scoring rule Fs for the case of the agenda and proﬁle
of our doctrinal paradox example. The entries in Table 2 are derived as follows. First, enter
Score of...
p ¬p q ¬q r ¬r pqr p¬q¬r ¬pq¬r ¬p¬q¬r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0
Indiv. 2 (p¬q¬r) 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 2
Indiv. 3 (¬pq¬r) 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 3 2
Group 2 1 2 1 1 2 5* 5* 5* 4
Table 2: Simple scoring (1) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and proﬁle
the score of each proposition (p,¬p, q, ...) from each individual (1, 2 and 3). Second, enter
each individual’s score of each judgment set by taking the row-wise sum. For instance,
individual 1’s score of pqr is 1 + 1+ 1 = 3, and his score of p¬q¬r is 1+ 0+ 0 = 1. Third,
enter the group’s score of each proposition by taking the column-wise sum. For instance,
the group’s score of p is 1 + 1 + 0 = 2. Finally, enter the group’s score of each judgment
set, by taking either a vertical or a horizontal sum (the two give the same result), and
add a star ‘*’ in the ﬁeld(s) with maximal score to indicate the winning judgment set(s).
For instance, the group’s score of pqr using a vertical sum is 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, and using a
horizontal sum it is 2+ 2+1 = 5. Since the judgment sets pqr, p¬q¬r and ¬pq¬r all have
maximal group score, the scoring rule delivers a tie:
F (A1, A2, A3) = {pqr, p¬q¬r,¬pq¬r}.
This is a tie between the premise-based outcome pqr and the conclusion-based outcomes
p¬q¬r and ¬pq¬r. Were we to add more individuals, the tie would presumably be broken
in one way or the other. In large groups, ties are a rare coincidence.
To link simple scoring to distance-based aggregation, suppose we measure the distance
between two rational judgment sets by using some distance function (‘metric’) d over D.7
The most common example is Hamming distance d = dHam , deﬁned as follows (where by
a ‘judgment reversal’ I mean the replacement of an accepted proposition by its negation):
dHam (A,B) = number of judgment reversals needed to transform A into B
= |A\B| = |B\A| = 1
2
|A△B| .
For instance, the Hamming-distance between pqr and p¬q¬r (for our doctrinal paradox
agenda) is 2.
Now the distance-based rule w.r.t. distance d is the aggregation rule Fd which for
any proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn determines the collective judgment set(s) by minimizing the
sum-total distance to the individual judgment sets:
Fd(A1, ...,An) = judgment set(s) in D with minimal sum-distance to the proﬁle
= argminC∈D

i∈N
d(C,Ai).
7A distance function or metric over D is a function d : D × D → [0,∞) satisfying three conditions:
for all A,B,C ∈ D, (i) d(A,B) = 0 ⇔ A = B, (ii) d(A,B) = d(B,A) (‘symmetry’), and (iii) d(A,C) ≤
d(A,B) + d(B,C) (‘triangle inequality’).
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The most popular example, Hamming rule FdH am , can be characterized as a scoring rule:
Proposition 1 The simple scoring rule is the Hamming rule.
3.2 Classical scoring rules for preference aggregation
I now show that our scoring rules generalize the classical scoring rules of preference ag-
gregation theory. Consider the preference agenda X for a given set of alternatives K of
ﬁnite size k. Classical scoring rules (such as Borda rule) are deﬁned by assigning scores
to alternatives in K, not to propositions xPy in X. Given a strict linear order ≻ over K,
each alternative x ∈ K is assigned a score SCO≻(x) ∈ R. The most popular example is of
course Borda scoring, for which the highest ranked alternative in K scores k, the second-
highest k − 1, the third-highest k − 2, ..., and the lowest 1. Given a proﬁle (≻1, ...,≻n)
of individual preferences (strict linear orders), the collective ranks the alternatives x ∈ X
according to their sum-total score

i∈N SCO≻i(x). To translate this into the judgment
aggregation formalism, recall that each strict linear order ≻ over K uniquely corresponds
to a rational judgment set A ∈ D (given by xPy ∈ A ⇔ x ≻ y); we may therefore write
SCOA(x) instead of SCO≻(x), and view the classical scoring SCO as a function of (x,A)
in K×D. Formally, I deﬁne a classical scoring as an arbitrary function SCO : K×D → R,
and the classical scoring rule w.r.t. it as the judgment aggregation rule F ≡ FSCO for the
preference agenda which for every proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn returns the rational judgment
set(s) that rank an alternative x over another y whenever x has a higher sum-total score
than y:8
F (A1, ..., An) = {C ∈ D : C contains all xPy ∈ X s.t.

i∈N
SCOAi(x) >

i∈N
SCOAi(y)}.
Now, any given classical scoring SCO induces a scoring s in our (proposition-based) sense.
In fact, there are two canonical (and, as we will see, equivalent) ways to deﬁne s: one might
deﬁne s either by
sA(xPy) = SCOA(x)− SCOA(y), (2)
or, if one would like the lowest achievable score to be zero, by
sA(xPy) = max{SCOA(x)− SCOA(y), 0} =

SCOA(x)− SCOA(y) if xPy ∈ A
0 if xPy ∈ A
(3)
(where the last equality assumes that SCOA(x) > SCOA(y) ⇔ xPy ∈ A for all x, y
and A, a property that is so natural that we might have built it into the deﬁnition of a
‘classical scoring’ SCO). This allows us to characterize classical scoring rules in terms of
proposition-based rather than alternative-based scoring:
8A technical diﬀerence between the standard notion of a scoring rule in preference aggregation theory
and our judgment-theoretic rendition of it arises when there happen to exist distinct alternatives with
identical sum-total score. In such cases, the standard scoring rule returns collective indiﬀerences, whereas
our FSCO returns a tie between strict preferences. From a formal perspective, however, the two deﬁnitions
are equivalent, since to any weak order corresponds the set (tie) of all strict linear orders which linearize
the weak order by breaking its indiﬀerences (in any cycle-free way). The structural asymmetry between
input and output preferences of scoring rules as deﬁned standardly (i.e., the possibility of indiﬀerences at
the collective level) may have been one of the obstacles — albeit only a small, mainly psychological one —
for importing scoring rules and Borda aggregation into judgment aggregation theory.
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Proposition 2 In the case of the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives),
every classical scoring rule is a scoring rule, namely one with respect to a scoring s derived
from the classical scoring SCO via (2) or via (3).
3.3 Reversal scoring and a Borda rule for judgment aggregation
Given the agent’s judgment set A, let us think of the score of a proposition p ∈ X as a
measure of how ‘distant’ the negation ¬p is from A; so, p scores high if ¬p is far from A, and
low if ¬p is contained in A. More precisely, let the score of a proposition p given A ∈ D be
the number of judgment reversals needed to reject p, i.e., the number of propositions in A
that must (minimally) be negated in order to obtain a consistent judgment set containing
¬p. So, denoting the judgment set arising from A by negating the propositions in a subset
R ⊆ A by A¬R = (A\R) ∪ {¬r : r ∈ R}, so-called reversal scoring is deﬁned by
sA(p) = number of judgment reversals needed to reject p (4)
= min
R⊆A:A¬R∈D&p∈A¬R
|R| = min
A′∈D:p∈A′
|A\A′| = min
A′∈D:p∈A′
dHam(A,A
′).
For instance, a rejected proposition p ∈ A scores zero, since A itself contains ¬p so that
it suﬃces to negate zero propositions (R = ∅). An accepted proposition p ∈ A scores
1 if A remains consistent by negating p (R = {p}), and scores more than 1 otherwise
(R  {p}). Table 3 illustrates reversal scoring for our doctrinal paradox example. For
instance, individual 1’s judgment set pqr leads to a score of 2 for proposition p, since in
order for him to reject p he needs to negate not just p (as ¬pqr is inconsistent), but also
r (where ¬pq¬r is consistent). The scoring rule delivers a tie between the judgment sets
Score of...
p ¬p q ¬q r ¬r pqr p¬q¬r ¬pq¬r ¬p¬q¬r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 2 2 0
Indiv. 2 (p¬q¬r) 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 5 2 4
Indiv. 3 (¬pq¬r) 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 5 4
Group 3 2 3 2 2 4 8 9* 9* 8
Table 3: Reversal scoring (4) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and proﬁle
p¬q¬r and ¬pq¬r. This is a tie between two conclusion-based outcomes; the premise-based
outcome pqr is rejected (unlike for simple scoring in Section 3.1).
The remarkable feature of reversal scoring rule is that it generalizes Borda rule from
preference to judgment aggregation. Borda rule is initially only deﬁned for the preference
agenda X (for a given ﬁnite set of alternatives), namely as the classical scoring rule w.r.t.
Borda scoring; see the last subsection. The key observation is that reversal scoring is
intimately linked to Borda scoring:
Remark 1 In the case of the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives), reversal
scoring s is given by (3) with SCO deﬁned as classical Borda scoring.
Let me sketch the simple argument — it should sound familiar to social choice theorists.
Let s be reversal scoring, X the preference agenda for a set of alternatives K of size k <∞,
and SCO classical Borda scoring. Consider any xPy ∈ X and A ∈ D. If xPy ∈ X\A, then
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¬xPy = yPx ∈ A, which implies sA(xPy) = 0, as required by (3). Now suppose xPy ∈ A.
Clearly, SCOA(x) > SCOA(y). Consider the alternatives in the order ≻ established by A:
xk ≻ xk−1 ≻ · · · ≻ x ≻ · · · ≻ y ≻ · · · ≻ x1,
where xj is the alternative with SCOA(xj) = j. Step by step, we now move y up in the
ranking, where each step consists in raising the position (score) of y by one. Each step
corresponds to negating one proposition in A, namely the proposition zPy where z is the
alternative that is currently being ‘overtaken’ by y. After exactly SCOA(x) − SCOA(y)
steps, y has ‘overtaken’ x, i.e., xPy has been negated. So, sA(xPy) is at most SCOA(x)−
SCOA(y). It is exactly SCOA(x)− SCOA(y), since, as the reader may check, no smaller
number of judgment reversals allows y to ‘overtake’ x in the ranking.
Remark 1 and Proposition 2 imply that reversal scoring allows us to extend Borda rule
to arbitrary judgment aggregation problems:
Proposition 3 The reversal scoring rule generalizes Borda rule, i.e., matches it in the
case of the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives).
I note that one could use a perfectly equivalent variant of reversal scoring s which, in
the case of the preference agenda, is related to classical Borda scoring SCO via (2) instead
of (3):
Remark 2 Reversal scoring s is equivalent (in terms of the resulting scoring rule) to the
scoring s′ given by
s′A(p) = sA(p)− sA(¬p) =

sA(p) if p ∈ A
−sA(¬p) if p ∈ A,
and in the case of the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives) this scoring is
given by
s′A(xPy) = SCOA(x)− SCOA(y)
with SCO deﬁned as classical Borda scoring.
For comparison, I now sketch Zwicker’s (2011) interesting approach to extending Borda
rule to judgment aggregation — let me call such an extension a ‘Borda-Zwicker’ rule. The
motivation derives from a geometric characterization of Borda preference aggregation ob-
tained by Zwicker (1991). Let me write the agenda as X = {p1,¬p1, p2,¬p2, ..., pm,¬pm},
where m is the number of ‘issues’. Each proﬁle gives rise to a vector v ≡ (v1, ..., vm) in Rm
whose jth entry vj is the net support for pj , i.e., the number of individuals accepting pj mi-
nus the same number for ¬pj . Now ifX is the preference agenda for any ﬁnite set of alterna-
tives K, then each pj takes the form xPy for certain alternatives x, y ∈ K. Each preference
cycle can be mapped to a vector in Rm; for instance, if p1 = xPy, p2 = yPz and p3 = xPz,
then the cycle x ≻ y ≻ z ≻ x becomes the vector (1, 1,−1, 0, ..., 0) ∈ Rm. The linear
span of all vectors corresponding to preference cycles deﬁnes the so-called ‘cycle space’
Vcycle ⊆ Rm, and its orthogonal complement deﬁnes the ‘cocycle space’ Vcocycle ⊆ Rm.
Let vcocycle be the orthogonal projection of v on the cocycle space Vcocycle. Intuitively,
vcocycle contains the ‘consistent’ or ‘acyclic’ part of v. The upshot is that the Borda out-
come can be read oﬀ from vcocyle: for each pj = xPy, the Borda group preference ranks x
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above (below) y if the jth entry of vcocyle is positive (negative). Zwicker’s strategy for ex-
tending Borda rule to judgment aggregation is to deﬁne a subspace Vcycle analogously for
agendas other than the preference agenda; one can then again project v on the orthogonal
complement of Vcycle and determine collective ‘Borda’ judgments according to the signs of
the entries of this projection. This approach has proved successful for simple agendas, in
which there is a natural way to deﬁne Vcycle. Whether the approach is viable for general
agendas (i.e., whether Vcycle has a useful general deﬁnition) seems to be open so far.
9
A Borda-Zwicker rule is not just constructed diﬀerently from a scoring rule in our sense,
but, as I conjecture, it also cannot generally be remodelled as a scoring rule, since most
interesting scoring rules use information that goes beyond the information contained in
the proﬁle’s ‘net support vector’ v ∈ Rm. (Even more does the required information go
beyond the projection of v on the orthogonal complement of Vcycle.)
In summary, there seem to exist two quite diﬀerent approaches to generalizing Borda
aggregation. One approach, taken by Zwicker, seeks to ﬁlter out the proﬁle’s ‘inconsistent
component’ along the lines of the just-described geometric technique. The other approach,
taken here, seeks to retain the principle of score-maximization inherent in Borda aggrega-
tion (with scoring now deﬁned at the level of propositions, not alternatives, as these do
not exist outside the world of preferences). The normative core of the scoring approach is
to use information about someone’s strength of accepting a proposition (as measured by
the score), just as Borda preference aggregation uses information about someone’s strength
of preferring one alternative x over another y (as measured by the score of xPy, i.e., the
diﬀerence between x’s and y’s score). Whether strength or intensity of preference is a
permissible or even meaningful concept is a notoriously controversial question; the purely
ordinalist approach takes a sceptical stance here. This is where Borda preference aggrega-
tion diﬀers from Condorcet’s rule of pairwise majority voting, which uses only the (ordinal)
information of whether someone prefers an alternative over another, without attempting
to extract strength-of-preference information from that person’s full preference relation.
3.4 A generalization of reversal scoring
Recall that the reversal score of a proposition p can be characterized as the distance by
which one must deviate from the current judgment set in order to reject p — where ‘distance’
is understood as Hamming-distance. It is natural to also consider other kinds of a distance.
Relative to any given distance function d over D, one may deﬁne a corresponding scoring
by
sA(p) = distance by which one must depart from A to reject p (5)
= min
A′∈D:p∈A′
d(A,A′).
This provides us with a whole class of scoring rules, all of which are variants of our
judgment-theoretic Borda rule. In the special case of the preference agenda, we thus
obtain new variants of classical Borda rule.
Interestingly, if we adopt Duddy and Piggins’ (2011) distance function, i.e., if d(A,A′)
is the number of minimal consistent modiﬁcations needed to transform A into A′,10 then
9One might at ﬁrst be tempted to generally deﬁne Vcycle as the linear span of those vectors which
correspond to the agenda’s minimal inconsistent subsets. Unfortunately, this span is often the entire space
Rm, an example for this being our doctrinal paradox agenda.
10Judgment sets A,B ∈ D are minimal consistent modiﬁcations of each other if the set S = A\B of
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scoring (5) reduces to simple scoring (1), and so the scoring rule reduces to the Hamming
rule by Proposition 1. So, ironically, while Duddy and Piggins had introduced their distance
in the diﬀerent context of distance-based aggregation to develop an alternative to Hamming
rule, when we use their distance (instead of Hamming’s) in our context of scoring rules we
are led back to Hamming rule.
3.5 Scoring based on logical entrenchment
We now consider scoring rules which explicitly exploit the logical structure of the agenda.
Let us think of the score of a proposition p (∈ X) given the judgment set A (∈ D) as the
degree to which p is logically entrenched in the belief system A, i.e., as the ‘strength’ with
which A entails p. We measure this strength by the number of ways in which p is entailed
by A, where each ‘way’ is given by a particular judgment subset S ⊆ A which entails p,
i.e., for which S ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent. If A does not contain p, then no judgment subset
— not even the full set A — can entail p; so the strength of entailment (score) of p is zero.
If A contains p, then p is entailed by the judgment subset {p}, and perhaps also by very
diﬀerent judgment subsets; so the strength of entailment (score) of p is positive and more
or less high.
There are diﬀerent ways to formalise this idea, depending on precisely which of the
judgment subsets that entail p are deemed relevant. I now propose four formalizations.
Two of them will once again allow us to generalize Borda rule from preference to judgment
aggregation. These generalizations diﬀer from that based on reversal scoring in Section
3.3.
Our ﬁrst, naive approach is to count each judgment subset which entails p as a separate,
full-ﬂedged ‘way’ in which p is entailed. This leads to so-called entailment scoring, deﬁned
by:
sA(p) = number of judgment subsets which entail p (6)
= |{S ⊆ A : S entails p}| .
If p ∈ A then sA(p) = 0, while if p ∈ A then sA(p) ≥ 2|X|/2−1 since p is entailed by at least
all sets S ⊆ A which contain p, i.e., by at least 2|A|−1 = 2|X|/2−1 sets. One might object
that this deﬁnition of scoring involves redundancies, i.e., ‘multiple counting’. Suppose for
instance p belongs to A and is logically independent of all other propositions in A. Then p
is entailed by several subsets S of A — all S ⊆ A which contain p — and yet these entailments
are essentially identical since all premises in S other than p are irrelevant.
I now present three reﬁnements of scoring (6), each of which responds diﬀerently to the
mentioned redundancy objection. In the ﬁrst reﬁnement, we count two entailments of p
as diﬀerent only if they have no premise in common. This leads to what I call disjoint-
entailment scoring, formally deﬁned by:
sA(p) = number of mutually disjoint judgment subsets entailing p (7)
= max{m : A has m mutually disjoint subsets each entailing p}.
propositions in A which need to be negated to transform A into B is non-empty and minimal (i.e., A
couldn’t have been transformed into a consistent set by negating only a strict non-empty subset of S). For
our doctrinal paradox agenda, the judgment sets pqr and p¬q¬r are minimal consistent modiﬁcations of
each other, and hence have Duddy-Piggins-distance of 1.
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In the mentioned case where p (∈ A) is logically independent of all other propositions in
A, we now avoid ‘multiple counting’: sA(p) is only 1, as one cannot ﬁnd diﬀerent mutually
disjoint judgment subsets entailing p. For our doctrinal paradox agenda and proﬁle, the
scoring rule delivers a tie between the two conclusion-based outcomes p¬q¬r and ¬pq¬r,
Score of...
p ¬p q ¬q r ¬r pqr p¬q¬r ¬pq¬r ¬p¬q¬r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 2 2 0
Indiv. 2 (p¬q¬r) 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 5 2 4
Indiv. 3 (¬pq¬r) 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 5 4
Group 3 2 3 2 2 4 8 9* 9* 8
Table 4: Disjoint-entailment scoring (7) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and proﬁle
as illustrated in Table 4. For instance, individual 2 has judgment set p¬q¬r, so that p
sores 1 (it is entailed by {p} but by no other disjoint judgment subset), ¬q scores 2 (it
is disjointly entailed by {¬q} and {p,¬r}), ¬r scores 2 (it is disjointly entailed by {¬r}
and {¬q}), and all rejected propositions score zero (they are not entailed by any judgment
subsets).
Disjoint-entailment scoring turns out to match reversal scoring for our doctrinal paradox
agenda (check that Tables 3 and 4 coincide), as well as for the preference agenda (as shown
later). Is this pure coincidence? The general relationship is that the disjoint-entailment
score of a proposition p is always at most the reversal score, as one may show.11
While this reﬁnement of naive entailment scoring (6) avoids ‘multiple counting’ by only
counting entailments with mutually disjoint sets of premises, the next two reﬁnements use
a diﬀerent strategy to avoid ‘multiple counting’. The new strategy is to count only those
entailments whose sets of premises are minimal — with minimality understood either in the
sense that no premises can be removed, or in the sense that no premises can be logically
weakened. To begin with the ﬁrst sense of minimality, I say that a set minimally entails
p (∈ X) if it entails p but no strict subset of it entails p, and I deﬁne minimal-entailment
scoring by
sA(p) = number of judgment subsets which minimally entail p (8)
= |{S ⊆ A : S minimally entails p}| .
If for instance p is contained in A, then {p} minimally entails p,12 but strict supersets of
{p} do not and are therefore not counted. For our doctrinal paradox agenda, this scoring
happens to coincide with reversal scoring and disjoint-entailment scoring. Indeed, Table 3
resp. 4 still applies; e.g., for individual 2 with judgment set p¬q¬r, p still scores 1 (it is
minimally entailed only by {p}), ¬q still scores 2 (it is minimally entailed by {¬q} and by
{p,¬r}), ¬r still scores 2 (it is minimally entailed by {¬r} and by {¬q}), and all rejected
propositions still score zero (they are not minimally entailed by any judgment subsets).
Scoring (8) is certainly appealing. Nonetheless, one might complain that it still al-
lows for certain redundancies, albeit of a diﬀerent kind. Consider the preference agenda
with set of alternatives K = {x, y, z,w}, and the judgment set A = {xPy, yPz, zPw,
11The reason is that, given m mutually disjoint judgment subsets which each entail p, the reversal score
of p is at least m since one must negate at least one proposition from each of these m sets in order to
consistently reject p.
12Assuming that p is not a tautology, i.e., that {¬p} is consistent. (Otherwise, ∅ minimally entails p.)
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xPz, yPw, xPw} (∈ D). The proposition xPw is minimally entailed by the subset
S = {xPy, yPz, zPw}. While this entailment is minimal in the (set-theoretic) sense that
we cannot remove premises, it is non-minimal in the (logical) sense that we can weaken
some of its premises: if we replace xPy and yPz in S by their logical implication xPz,
then we obtain a weaker set of premises S′ = {xPz, zPw} which still entails xPw. We
shall say that S fails to ‘irreducibly’ entail xPw, in spite of minimally entailing it. In
general, a set of propositions is called weaker than another one (which is called stronger)
if the second set entails each member of the ﬁrst set, but not vice versa. A set S (⊆ X)
is deﬁned to irreducibly (or logically minimally) entail p if S entails p, and moreover there
is no subset Y  S which can be weakened (i.e., for which there is a weaker set Y ′ ⊆ X
such that (S\Y )∪ Y ′ still entails p). Each irreducible entailment is a minimal entailment,
as is seen by taking Y ′ = ∅.13 In the previous example, the set {xPy, yPz, zPw} mini-
mally, but not irreducibly entails xPw, and the set {xPz, zPw} irreducibly entails xPw.
Irreducible-entailment scoring is naturally deﬁned by
sA(p) = number of judgment subsets which irreducibly entail p (9)
= |{S ⊆ A : S irreducibly entails p}| .
This scoring matches reversal scoring and both previous scorings in the case of our doc-
trinal paradox example: Table 3 resp. 4 still applies. But for many other agendas these
scorings all deviate from one another, resulting in diﬀerent collective judgments. As for
the preference agenda, we have already announced the following result:
Proposition 4 Disjoint-entailment scoring (7) and irreducible-entailment scoring (9) match
reversal scoring (4) in the case of the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives).
Propositions 3 and 4 jointly have an immediate corollary.
Corollary 1 The scoring rules w.r.t. scorings (7) and (9) both generalize Borda rule, i.e.,
match it in the case of the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives).
3.6 Propositionwise scoring and a way to repair quota rules with
non-rational outputs
We now consider a special class of scorings: propositionwise scorings. This will allow us to
relate scoring rules to the well-known judgment aggregation rules called quota rules — in
fact, to ‘repair’ these rules by rendering their outcomes rational across all proﬁles.
I call scoring s propositionwise if the score of a proposition p ∈ X only depends on
whether p is accepted, i.e., if sA(p) = sB(p) whenever A and B (in D) both contain p or
both do not contain p. Equivalently, scoring is propositionwise just in case for each p ∈ X
there is a pair of real numbers s+(p), s−(p) such that
sA(p) =

s+(p) for all A ∈ D containing p
s−(p) for all A ∈ D not containing p. (10)
Intuitively, s+(p) is the score of an accepted proposition p, and s−(p) is the score of a
rejected proposition p. Typically, of course, s+(p) > s−(p). An example is simple scoring:
there, s+(p) = 1 and s−(p) = 0.
13Assuming X contains no tautology, i.e., no p such that {¬p} is inconsistent.
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How do propositionwise scoring rules behave? They derive a proposition p’s sum-total
score ‘locally’, i.e., based only on people’s judgments about p. This property stands in
obvious analogy to a well-studied axiom on aggregation rules, namely the axiom of propo-
sitionwise or independent aggregation, which prescribes that the collective judgment about
any given proposition p is derived ‘locally’, i.e., again based only on people’s judgments
about p. Can we therefore relate propositionwise scoring to independent aggregation?
The paradigmatic independent aggregation rules are the quota rules.14 A quota rule is a
(single-valued) aggregation rule which is given by an acceptance threshold mp ∈ {1, ..., n}
for each proposition p ∈ X. The quota rule corresponding to the so-called threshold family
(mp)p∈X is denoted F(mp)p∈X and accepts those propositions p which are supported by at
least mp individuals: for each proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn,
F(mp)p∈X (A1, ..., An) = {p ∈ X : |{i : p ∈ Ai}| ≥mp}.
Special cases are unanimity rule (given by mp = n for all p), majority rule (given by
the majority threshold mp = ⌈(n+ 1)/2⌉ for all p), and more generally, uniform quota
rules (given by a uniform threshold mp ≡ m for all p). A uniform quota rules is also
referred to as a supermajority rule if m exceeds the majority threshold, and a submajority
rule if m is below the majority threshold. Note that supermajority rules may generate
incomplete collective judgment sets, while submajority rule may accept both members of
a pair p,¬p ∈ X, a drastic form of inconsistency. If one wishes that exactly one member
of each pair p,¬p ∈ X is accepted, the thresholds of p and ¬p should be ‘complements’ of
each other: mp = n+ 1−m¬p.
A non-trivial question is how the acceptance thresholds would have to be set to ensure
that the collective judgment set satisﬁes some given degree of rationality, such as to be (i)
consistent, or (ii) deductively closed, or (iii) consistent and deductively closed, or even (iv)
fully rational, i.e., in D. These questions have been settled (see Nehring and Puppe 2010a
for (iv), and, subsequently, Dietrich and List 2007b for (i)-(iv)). Unfortunately, for many
agendas the thresholds would have to be set at ‘extreme’ and normatively unattractive
levels. Worse, often no thresholds achieve (iv) (see Nehring and Puppe 2010a). For our
doctrinal paradox agenda X = {p, q, r}± only the extreme thresholds mp = mq = mr = n
and m¬p = m¬q = m¬r = 1 achieve (iv), and for the preference agenda (with more than
two alternatives) no thresholds achieve (iv).
Given that quota rules with ‘reasonable’ thresholds typically violate many of the condi-
tions (i)-(iv), one may want to depart from ordinary quota rules by modifying (‘repairing’)
them so that they always generate rational outputs. This can be done by using proposi-
tionwise scoring rules. Given an arbitrary quota rule with threshold family (mp)p∈X , one
can specify a propositionwise scoring such that the scoring rule replicates the quota rule
whenever the quota rule generates a rational output, while ‘repairing’ the output other-
wise. How must we calibrate s+(p) and s−(p) in order to achieve this? The idea is that
individuals who accept p should contribute a positive score s+(p) > 0, while those who
reject p should contribute a negative score s−(p) < 0. The absolute sizes of s+(p) and
s−(p) should be calibrated such that the sum-total score of p becomes positive (helping
the scoring rule to accept p) exactly when the quota rule accepts p, i.e., when at least mp
individuals accept p. Speciﬁcally, we set:
sA(p) =

s+(p) = n+ 1−mp for all A ∈ D containing p
s−(p) = −mp for all A ∈ D not containing p. (11)
14They are the only independent rules which are anonymous, monotonic and unanimity-preserving.
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Intuitively, the higher the acceptance threshold mp is, the smaller the positive contribution
s+(p) is and the larger the negative contribution s−(p) is (in absolute value); hence, the
more individuals accepting p are needed for p’s sum-total score to get positive, and the
harder it becomes for the scoring rule to accept p. This scoring does the intended job:
Proposition 5 For every threshold family (mp)p∈X , the scoring rule w.r.t. scoring (11)
matches the quota rule F(mp)p∈X at all proﬁles where the quota rule generates rational
outputs (and still generates rational outputs at all other proﬁles).
As an example, consider our doctrinal paradox agenda X = {p, q, r}± with n = 3
individuals, and suppose the quota rule departs only slightly from propositionwise majority
voting: all propositions t in X\{¬r} keep a majority threshold of mt = 2, but ¬r receives
a unanimity threshold m¬r = 3. This quota rule manages to never generate logically
inconsistent collective judgment sets,15 but does so at the expense of allowing collective
incompleteness. Indeed, for our example proﬁle, the quota rule returns the collective
judgment set pq, which is silent on the choice between r nor ¬r. As illustrated in Table 5,
the scoring rule w.r.t. (11) restores collective rationality by leading to the premise-based
Score of...
p ¬p q ¬q r ¬r pqr p¬q¬r ¬pq¬r ¬p¬q¬r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 2 -2 2 -2 2 -3 6 -3 -3 -7
Indiv. 2 (p¬q¬r) 2 -2 -2 2 -2 1 -2 5 -3 1
Indiv. 3 (¬pq¬r) -2 2 2 -2 -2 1 -2 -3 5 1
Group 2 -2 2 -2 -2 -1 2* -1 -1 -5
Table 5: Scoring (11) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and proﬁle
outcome pqr. To read the table, note that scoring (11) is given by s+(t) = 2 and s−(t) = −2
for all t in X\{¬r}, s+(¬r) = 1 and s−(¬r) = −3.
How does our scoring rule ‘repair’ those special quota rules which use a uniform thresh-
old m ≡mp (p ∈ X), such as majority rule?
Remark 3 For a uniform threshold m ≡ mp, the scoring rule w.r.t. scoring (11) is the
Hamming rule, or equivalently, the simple scoring rule.
This remark follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that, for a uniform threshold
m ≡ mp, scoring (11) is equivalent to simple scoring by footnote 6.
Finally, I note that the scoring rules w.r.t. (11) is not the only scoring rule which can
‘repair’ the quota rule F(mp)p∈X — though it might be the most plausible one, as long as we
do not wish to introduce additional parameters. If, however, we are prepared to introduce
additional parameters, scoring (11) can be generalized: for each p ∈ X let αp > 0 be a
coeﬃcient measuring how important it is that the scoring rule is faithful to the quota rule’s
collective judgment on p; and let scoring be deﬁned by
sA(p) =

s+(p) = αp(n+ 1−mp) if p ∈ A
s−(p) = −αpmp if p ∈ A. (12)
15This follows from Nehring and Puppe’s (2010) intersection property, generalized to possibly incomplete
collective judgment sets (Dietrich and List 2007b).
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The earlier scoring (11) is obviously a special case in which all αp are 1. Proposition
5 still holds for this generalized kind of propositionwise scoring. The scoring rule will
tend to match the quota rule on propositions p with high importance coeﬃcient αp, while
modifying (‘repairing’) the quota rule at propositions p with low αp.
3.7 Premise- and conclusion-based aggregation
I have just mentioned the possibility of a diﬀerential treatment of propositions when ‘re-
pairing’ a quota rule. This possibility is particularly salient in the popular context of
premise- or conclusion-based aggregation.16 One may indeed view the classical premise-
and conclusion-based rules as two (rival) ways of repairing the simplest of all quota rules —
majority rule — by privileging certain propositions over others, namely premise propositions
or conclusion propositions, respectively.
Let me put this precisely. Consider majority voting, i.e., the quota rule with a uniform
majority threshold m ≡ mp (the smallest integer above n/2). To restore collective ratio-
nality, we again endow each proposition p ∈ X with a ‘coeﬃcient of importance’, but now
let this coeﬃcient be determined by whether p has a ‘premise’ or ‘conclusion’ status. For-
mally, suppose the agenda is partitioned into two negation-closed sets, the set P of ‘premise
propositions’ and the set X\P of ‘conclusion propositions’. In the case of our doctrinal
paradox agenda X = {p, q, r}±, we have P = {p, q}±. Each premise proposition p ∈ P has
the importance coeﬃcient αp ≡ αpremise, and each conclusion proposition p ∈ X\P has
the importance coeﬃcient αp ≡ αconclusion, for ﬁxed parameters αpremise, αconclusion ≥ 0.
In this scenario, the scoring (12) becomes equivalent (by footnote 6) to the scoring given
by
sA(p) =


αpremise for accepted premise propositions p ∈ A ∩ P
αconclusion for accepted conclusion propositions p ∈ A\P
0 for rejected propositions p ∈ A.
(13)
By calibrating the two importance coeﬃcients, we can inﬂuence the relative weights of
premises and conclusions. If we give far more importance to premise propositions (αpremise ≫
αcoclusion) or to conclusion propositions (αcoclusion ≫ αpremise), the scoring rule reduces to
the premise- or conclusion-based rule, respectively. To substantiate this claim, one needs
to deﬁne both rules. For simplicity, I restrict attention to our doctrinal paradox agenda
X = {p, q, r}± with P = {p, q}± (though more general X and P could be considered17).
In this case, assuming for simplicity that the group size n is odd,
• the premise-based rule is the aggregation rule which for each proﬁle in Dn delivers
the (unique) judgment set in D containing each premise proposition accepted by a
majority;
• the conclusion-based rule is the aggregation rule which for each proﬁle in Dn delivers
the judgment set (or sets) in D containing the conclusion proposition accepted by a
majority.18
These two rules have the following characterizations as scoring rules:
16See for instance List (2004), Dietrich and Mongin (2010) and Nehring and Puppe (2010b).
17Our analysis generalizes easily to any X and P such that (i) the premise propositions in P are logically
independent, and (ii) complete judgments across the premise propositions in P uniquely determine the
judgments on the conclusion propositions in X\P .
18 In the literature, the conclusion-based procedure is usually taken to be silent on the premises, i.e., to
return an incomplete judgment set not in D. I have replaced this silence by a tie between all compatible
judgments on the premise propositions.
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Remark 4 For our doctrinal paradox agenda X = {p, q, r}± with set of premise proposi-
tions P = {p, q}±, and for an odd group size, the scoring rule w.r.t. scoring (13) is
• the premise-based rule if and only if αpremise > (n− 2)αconclusion,
• the conclusion-based rule if and only if αconclusion > αpremise = 0.
This result lets premise- and conclusion-based aggregation appear in a rather ex-
treme light: each rule is based on somewhat unequal importance coeﬃcients αpremise and
αconclusion, deeming one type of proposition to be overwhelmingly more important than
the other. It might therefore be interesting to consider more equilibrated values of the
importance coeﬃcients, so as to achieve a compromise between democracy at the premise
level and democracy at the conclusion level.
4 Set scoring rules: assigning scores to entire judgment
sets
An interesting generalization of scoring rules is obtained by assigning scores directly to
entire judgment sets rather than single propositions. A set scoring function — or simply set
scoring — is a function σ which to every pair of rational judgment sets C and A assigns a
real number σA(C), the score of C given A, which measures how well C performs (‘scores’)
from the perspective of holding the judgment set A. Formally, σ : D ×D → R. The most
elementary example, to be called naive set scoring, is given by
σA(C) =

1 if C = A
0 if C = A. (14)
Any set scoring σ gives rise to an aggregation rule Fσ, the set scoring rule (or general-
ized scoring rule) w.r.t. σ, which for each proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn selects the collective
judgment set(s) C in D having maximal sum-total score across individuals:
Fσ(A1, ..., An) = argmaxC∈D

i∈N
σAi(C).
An aggregation rule is a set scoring rule simpliciter if it is the set scoring rule w.r.t. to
some set scoring σ. Set scoring rules generalize ordinary scoring rules, since to any ordinary
scoring s corresponds a set scoring σ, given by
σA(C) ≡

p∈C
sA(p),
and the ordinary scoring rule w.r.t. s coincides with the set scoring rule w.r.t. σ.
4.1 Naive set scoring and plurality voting
Plurality rule is the aggregation rule F which for every proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn declares
the most often submitted judgment set(s) as the collective judgment set(s):
F (A1, ..., An) = most frequently submitted judgment set(s)
= argmaxC∈D |{i : Ai = C}| .
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This rule is of course normatively questionable;19 but it deserves our attention, if only
because of its simplicity and the recognized importance of plurality voting in social choice
theory more broadly. Plurality rule can be construed as a set scoring rule:
Remark 5 The naive set scoring rule is plurality rule.
4.2 Distance-based set scoring
Set scoring rules generalize distance-based aggregation. Given an arbitrary distance func-
tion d over D (not necessarily the Hamming-distance), all that is needed is to consider
what I call distance-based set scoring, deﬁned by
σA(C) = −d(C,A). (15)
So, C scores high if it is close to the judgment set held, A. This renders sum-score-
maximization equivalent to sum-distance-minimization:
Remark 6 For every given distance function over D, the distance-based set scoring rule
is the distance-based rule.
So, all distance-based rules can be modelled as set scoring rules (but not vice versa20).
As an example, consider the so-called discrete distance,21 deﬁned by
d(A,B) =

0 if A = B
1 if A = B.
Here, distance-based set scoring (15) is equivalent to naive set scoring (14), since the two
diﬀer only by a constant (of one). So, joining Remarks 5 and 6, we may view plurality rule
either as the naive set scoring rule or as the discrete-distance-based rule.
4.3 Approximating the ‘average voter’
Given an ordinary scoring s, we have so far aimed for collective judgments with high total
score. But this is not the only plausible aim or approach. We now turn to an altogether
diﬀerent approach. Rather than using s to assign scores only from each individual’s per-
spective, we now care about how propositions score under the collective judgment set.
Instead of wanting the collective judgments to get highest total score from individuals,
we now want them to resemble an ‘average individual’s judgments’ in the sense that the
collective judgments should lead (approximately) to the same scores of propositions as the
individual judgments do on average. In short, any proposition p’s collective score should be
(approximately) p’s average individual score. This approach has its own, rather diﬀerent
intuitive appeal. But is it really totally diﬀerent? As will turn out, aggregation rules which
19 It ignores the internal structure of judgment sets, hence ‘throws away’ much information.
20 In trying to re-model an arbitrary set scoring rule Fσ as a distance-based rule, one might be tempted
to deﬁne the ‘distance’ between A and B as dσ(A,B) := σA(A)−σA(B). If dσ turns out to deﬁne a proper
distance function (see fn. 7), then we obtain a distance-based rule Fdσ , which coincides with the set scoring
rule Fσ . But for many plausible set scorings σ, dσ has little in common with a distance function, violating
up to all three axioms, notably symmetry and the triangle inequality.
21This metric derives its name from the fact that it induces the discrete topology on whatever set it is
deﬁned on (such as R instead of D).
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follow this approach — I call them ‘average-score rules’ as opposed to ‘scoring rules’ — can
be viewed as a particular kind of set scoring rules. This result is in fact a special case of a
powerful precursor result by Zwicker (2008), as Marcus Pivato kindly pointed out to me.22
Given an ordinary scoring s, we can represent judgment sets in D as vectors in RX , by
identifying each judgment set A in D with its score vector, i.e., the vector in RX whose pth
component is the score of p, sA(p).
23 The score vector corresponding to A ∈ D is denoted
As ≡ (sA(p))p∈X ∈ RX . Having represented judgment sets as vectors of numbers, we can
apply standard algebraic and geometric operations, such as adding judgment sets, taking
their average, or measuring their distance — where, of course, sums or averages of (score
vectors of) judgment sets in D may be ‘infeasible’, i.e., not correspond to any judgment
set in D.
The average-score rule w.r.t. scoring s is deﬁned as the aggregation rule F which for
every proﬁle (A1, ...,An) ∈ Dn chooses the collective judgment set(s) whose score vector
comes closest to the group’s average score vector 1n

i∈N A
s
i in the sense of Euclidean
distance in RX :
F (A1, ..., An) = j.s. closest to the average individual j.s. in score vector terms
= argminC∈D
Cs − 1n

i∈N
Asi
 .
Viewed geometrically as an operation in RX , the collective score vector is the orthogonal
projection of the average score vector 1n

iA
s
i on the set Ds ≡ {As : A ∈ D} ⊆ RX of
feasible score vectors.24
As an illustration, consider once again reversal scoring for our doctrinal paradox agenda.
Table 6 reports the score vector of each judgment set (including the one not submitted by
p ¬p q ¬q r ¬r distance to group’s average
pqr (indiv. 1) 2 0 2 0 2 0
√
58/3 ≈ 2.54
p¬q¬r (indiv. 2) 1 0 0 2 0 2 √37/3 ≈ 2.03
¬pq¬r (indiv. 3) 0 2 1 0 0 2 √37/3 ≈ 2.03
¬p¬q¬r (no indiv.) 0 1 0 1 0 3 7/3 ≈ 2.33
group’s average 1 23 1
2
3
2
3
4
3
Table 6: The average-score rule (w.r.t. reversal scoring) for the doctrinal paradox agenda
and proﬁle
any individual), and its distance to the group’s average score vector. By minimizing this
distance, the rule delivers a tie between the two conclusion-based outcomes p¬q¬r and
¬pq¬r. The premise-based outcome pqr looks worse than ever: it is even farther from the
average than the never-submitted outcome ¬p¬q¬r.
Now that we have two rival ways of aggregating based on a scoring s — namely, the
scoring rule and the average-score rule — the question is whether any connection can be
22Average-score rules are special cases of Zwicker’s ‘mean proximity rules’ in his abstract, more gen-
eral aggregation framework. Zwicker’s Theorem 4.2.1 (more precisely, its proof) reveals that any ‘mean
proximity rule’ can be given a representation which essentially corresponds to our representation of an
average-score rule in Proposition 6.
23This identiﬁcation is one-to-one as long as the scoring has the (very plausible) property that sA(p) >
sA(¬p) whenever p ∈ A.
24Formally, F (A1, ..., An)s = PROJDs(
1
n

iA
s
i ), where the orthogonal projection of x ∈ R
X on Y ⊆ RX
is deﬁned as PROJY (x) := argminy∈Y y − x.
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established. The average-score rule can be construed as a set scoring rule, namely in virtue
of the set scoring given by
σA(C) = −Cs −As2 . (16)
Here, C is taken to score high if it is close to A in terms of the squared Euclidean distance
of score vectors.
Proposition 6 For any scoring s, the average-score rule w.r.t. s is the set scoring rule
w.r.t. set scoring (16).
As an application, let s be simple scoring (1). Here, the set scoring (16) is expressible
as an increasing aﬃne transformation of the set scoring corresponding to simple scoring,
i.e., of the set scoring σ′ given by25
σ′A(C) =

p∈C
sA(p) = |C ∩A| .
So, the set scoring rule Fσ coincides with the simple scoring rule Fs, and hence with the
Hamming rule FdH am by Proposition 1. Thus, as a corollary of Propositions 1 and 6, the
Hamming rule can be characterized not just as a scoring rule but also as an average-score
rule, both times using the same scoring:
Corollary 2 The Hamming rule is the scoring rule and the average-score rule, both times
w.r.t. simple scoring.
4.4 Probability-based set scoring
I close the analysis by taking a brief (skippable) excursion into an important, but diﬀer-
ent approach to judgment aggregation: the epistemic or truth-tracking approach. In this
approach, each proposition p ∈ X is taken to have an objective, but unknown truth value
(‘true’ or ‘false’), and the goal of aggregation is to track the truth, i.e., to generate true
collective judgments.26 The truth-tracking perspective has a long history elsewhere in so-
cial choice theory (e.g., Condorcet 1785, Grofman et al. 1983, Austen-Smith and Banks
1996, Dietrich 2006b, Pivato 2011a); but within judgment aggregation theory speciﬁcally,
rather little work has been done on the epistemic side (e.g., Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006b,
List 2005, Bozbay et al. 2011).
The epistemic approach warrants the use of particular set scoring rules. To show this, I
import standard statistical estimation techniques (such as maximum-likelihood estimation),
following the path taken by other authors in the context of preference aggregation (e.g.,
Young 1995) and other aggregation problems (e.g., Dietrich 2006b, Pivato 2011a). My goal
is to give no more than a brief introduction to what could be done. The results given below
are essentially variants of existing results; see in particular Pivato (2011a).27
25Since σA(C) = −

|C △A|
2
= −|C △A| = −2 |C\A| = −2 (|C| − |C ∩A|) = −|X|+ 2 |C ∩A|.
26The epistemic perspective is usually contrasted with the procedural perspective, which takes the goal of
aggregation to be to generate collective judgments which reﬂect the individuals’ judgments in a procedurally
fair way. To illustrate the contrast between the two perspectives, suppose that all individuals hold the same
judgment set A. Then A is clearly the right collective judgment set from the perspective of procedural
fairness. But from an epistemic perspective, all depends on whether people’s unanimous endorsement of
A is suﬃcient evidence for A being true.
27Proposition 7 follows from proofs in Pivato (2011a), and is also related to Dietrich (2006).
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For each combination (A1, ..., An, T ) ∈ Dn×D of n+1 judgment sets, let Pr(A1, ..., An, T )
> 0 measure the probability that people submit the proﬁle (A1, ..., An) and the set of true
propositions is T , where of course

(A1,...,An,T )∈Dn×D
Pr(A1, ..., An, T ) = 1. From this
joint probability function we can, as usual, derive various marginal and conditional prob-
abilities, such as the probability that the truth is T ∈ D, Pr(T ) =(A1,...,An)∈Dn Pr(A1, ...,
An, T ), the probability that the proﬁle is (A1, ..., An), Pr(A1, ..., An) =

T∈D Pr(A1, ..., An,
T ), the conditional probability Pr(T |A1, ..., An) = Pr(A1,...,An,T )Pr(A1,...,An) (called the posterior prob-
ability of T given the ‘data’ A1, ..., An), and the conditional probability Pr(A1, ..., An|T ) =
Pr(A1,...,An,T )
Pr(T ) (called the likelihood of the ‘data’ A1, ..., An given T ).
The maximum-likelihood rule is the aggregation rule F : Dn ⇒ D which for each proﬁle
(A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn deﬁnes the collective judgments such that their truth would make the
observed proﬁle (‘data’) maximally likely:
F (A1, ..., An) = argmaxT∈D Pr(A1, ..., An|T ).
The maximum-posterior rule is the aggregation rule F : Dn ⇒ D which for each proﬁle
(A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn deﬁnes the collective judgments such that they have maximal posterior
probability of truth conditional on the observed proﬁle (‘data’):
F (A1, ..., An) = argmaxT∈D Pr(T |A1, ...,An).
Both of these rules correspond to well-established statistical estimation procedures.
Let us now make two standard, but restrictive assumptions on probabilities. We assume
that voters are ‘independent’ and ‘equally competent’ (in analogy to the assumptions of
Condorcet’s classical jury theorem28). Formally, for every T ∈ D,
(IND) the individual judgment sets are independent conditional on T being the true judg-
ment set, i.e., Pr(A1, ..., An|T ) = Pr(A1|T ) · · ·Pr(An|T ) for all A1, ..., An ∈ D (‘in-
dependence’)
(COM) for each A ∈ D, each individual has the same probability, denoted Pr(A|T ), of
submitting the judgment set A conditional on T being the true judgment set (‘equal
competence’).
Condition (COM) in particular implies that individuals have the same (conditional)
probability of holding the true judgment set; but nothing is assumed about the size of
this probability of ‘getting it right’. The just-deﬁned aggregation rules turn out to be set
scoring rules in virtue of deﬁning the score of T ∈ D given A ∈ D by, respectively,
σA(T ) = log Pr(A|T ) (17)
σA(T ) = log Pr(A|T ) + 1
n
log Pr(T ). (18)
Proposition 7 If voters are independent (IND) and equally competent (COM), then
• the maximum-likelihood rule is the set scoring rule w.r.t. set scoring (17),
• the maximum-posterior rule is the set scoring w.r.t. set scoring (18).
28The classical Condorcet jury theorem is essentially concerned with a simple judgment aggregation
problem with a binary agenda X = {p,¬p}.
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5 Concluding remarks
I hope to have convinced the reader that scoring rules, and more generally set scoring
rules, form interesting positive solutions to the judgment aggregation problem. They for
instance allow us to generalize Borda aggregation to judgment aggregation (the simplest
method being to use reversal scoring). Figure 1 summarizes where we stand by depicting
diﬀerent classes of rules (scoring rules, set scoring rules, and distance-based rules) and
positioning several concrete rules (such as Hamming rule). While the positions of most
arbitrary rules 
distance-base
rules
scoring
rules
set scoring
rules 
the Condorcet-
admissibility rule
the “truth-tracking”
rules of Section 4.4
the Hamming rule
generalized 
Borda rule 
using, e.g., 
reversal scoring
non-anonymous 
rules
plurality rule
propositionwise
scoring rules
entailment-based
scoring rules (Section 3.4)
average-score
rules 
the premise-
and conclusion-
based rules 
(and other 
priority rules)
Figure 1: A map of judgment aggregation possibilities
rules in Figure 1 have been established above or follow easily, a few positions are of the
order of conjectures. This is so for the placement of our Borda generalization outside the
class of distance-based rules.29
Though several old and new aggregation rules are scoring rules (or at least set scoring
rules), there are important counterexamples. One counterexample is the mentioned rule
introduced by Nehring et al. (2011) (the so-called Condorcet-admissibility rule, which
generates rational judgment set(s) that ‘approximate’ the majority judgment set). Other
counterexamples are non-anonymous rules (such as rules prioritizing experts), and rules
that return boundedly rational collective judgments (such as rules returning incomplete but
still consistent and deductively closed judgments). The last two kinds of counterexamples
suggest two generalizations of the notion of a scoring rule. Firstly, scoring might be allowed
to depend on the individual; this leads to ‘non-anonymous scoring rules’. Secondly, the
search for a collective judgment set with maximal total score might be done within a larger
set than the set D of fully rational judgment sets (such as the set of consistent but possibly
incomplete judgment sets); this leads to ‘boundedly rational scoring rules’. The same
generalizations could of course be made for set scoring rules. Much work is ahead of us.
29For technical correctness, I also note two details about how to read Figure 1. First, for trivial agendas,
such as a single-issue agenda X = {p,¬p}, several rules of course become equivalent, and distinctions
drawn in Figure 1 disappear. More precisely, by positioning a rule outside a class of rules (e.g., by
positioning plurality rule outside the class of scoring rules), I am of course not implying that for all
agendas the rule does not belong to the class, but that for some (in fact, most) agendas this is so. Second,
in placing propositionwise scoring rules among the distance-based rules, I made a very plausible restriction:
s+(p) > s−(p) for each p ∈ X.
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7 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The Hamming-distance between A,C ∈ D can be written as
dHam (A,C) =
1
2
|A△B| = 1
2
(|X| − (|A ∩B|+ A ∩B)).
Now, since A and C each contains exactly one member of each pair {p,¬p} ⊆ X, we
have p ∈ A ∩ C ⇔ ¬p ∈ A ∩ C, and so, |A ∩C| = A ∩C. Hence, dHam (A,C) =
1
2 |X| − |A ∩C|. So, for each proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn, minimizing

i∈N dHam (Ai, C) is
equivalent to maximizing

i∈N |Ai ∩C|. Hence, rewriting each |Ai ∩C| as

p∈C sAi(p)
where s is simple scoring (1), it follows that FdH am (A1, ..., An) = Fs(A1, ..., An). 
Before proving Proposition 2, I start with a lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider the preference agenda (for any ﬁnite set of alternatives K), any clas-
sical scoring SCO, and the scoring s given by (3). For all distinct x, y ∈ K and all A ∈ D,
SCOA(x)− SCOA(y) = sA(xPy)− sA(yPx). (19)
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Proof. This follows easily from (3). 
Two elements of a set of alternatives K are called neighbours w.r.t. a strict linear order
≻ over K if they diﬀer and no alternative in K is ranked strictly between them. In the
case of the preference agenda (for a set of alternatives K), the strict linear order over K
corresponding to any A ∈ D is denoted ≻A.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the preference agenda X for a set of alternatives K of
ﬁnite size k, and let SCO be any classical scoring. I show that FSCO = Fs for each scoring
s satisfying (19), and hence for the scoring (3) (since it satisﬁes (19) by Lemma 1) and the
scoring (2) (since a half times it satisﬁes (19)).
Consider any scoring s satisfying (19). Fix a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn; I show Fs(A1, ...,
An) = FSCO(A1, ..., An). The proof is in three claims.
Claim 1. For all a, b ∈ K and C,C ′ ∈ D, if C\C ′ = {aPb}, then
i∈N
SCOAi(a)−

i∈N
SCOAi(b) =

i∈N,p∈C
sAi(p)−

i∈N,p∈C′
sAi(p).
Consider a, b ∈ K and C,C′ ∈ D such that C\C′ = {aPb}. For each individual i ∈ N ,
we by (19) have
SCOAi(a)− SCOAi(b) = sAi(aPb)− sAi(bPa),
which, noting that C′ = (C\{aPb}) ∪ {bPa}, implies that
SCOAi(a)− SCOAi(b) =

p∈C
sAi(p)−

p∈C′
sAi(p).
Summing over all individuals, the claim follows, q.e.d.
Claim 2. Fs(A1, ..., An) ⊆ FSCO(A1, ..., An).
Consider any C ∈ Fs(A1, ...,An). We have to show that C ∈ FSCO(A1, ..., An), i.e.,
that for all distinct x, y ∈ K,
i∈N
SCOAi(x) >

i∈N
SCOAi(y)⇒ xPy ∈ C,
or equivalently,
yPx ∈ C ⇒

i∈N
SCOAi(y) ≥

i∈N
SCOAi(x).
Said in yet another way, we have to show that
i∈N
SCOAi(xk) ≥

i∈N
SCOAi(xk−1) ≥ · · · ≥

i∈N
SCOAi(x1),
where I have labelled the alternatives x1, x2, ..., xk such that xk ≻C xk−1 ≻C · · · ≻C x1.
Consider any t ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}, and write a for xt+1 and b for xt. Let C′ be the judgment
set arising from C by replacing aPb with its negation bPa. Now C ′ ∈ D; this is because
a and b are neighbours w.r.t. ≻C , which guarantees that C ′ corresponds to a strict linear
order (namely to the same one as for C except that b now ranks above a). Since C ∈
Fs(A1, ..., An), C has maximal sum-total score within D; in particular,
i∈N,p∈C
sAi(p) ≥

i∈N,p∈C′
sAi(p),
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which by Claim 1 implies the desired inequality,
i∈N
SCOAi(a) ≥

i∈N
SCOAi(b), q.e.d.
Claim 3. FSCO(A1, ...,An) ⊆ Fs(A1, ..., An).
Consider any C ∈ FSCO(A1, ..., An). To show that C ∈ Fs(A1, ..., An), we consider an
arbitrary C′ ∈ D\{C} and have to show that C has an at least as high sum-total score as
C′: 
i∈N,p∈C
sAi(p) ≥

i∈N,p∈C′
sAi(p). (20)
To prove this, we ﬁrst transform C gradually into C ′ in m ≡ |C′\C| steps, where each
step consists in a single judgment reversal, i.e., in the replacement of a single proposition
xPy (∈ C\C′) by its negation yPx (∈ C ′\C). This deﬁnes a sequence of judgment sets
C0, ..., Cm, where C0 = C and Cm = C
′, and where for each step t ∈ {1, ...,m} there is
a proposition xtPyt such that Ct = (Ct−1\{xtPyt}) ∪ {ytPxt}. Note that {xtPyt : t =
1, ...,m} = C\C′. By a standard relation-theoretic argument, we may assume that in each
step t the judgment reversal consists in switching the relative order of two neighbouring
alternatives; i.e., xt, yt are neighbours w.r.t. the old and new relations ≻Ct−1 and ≻Ct .
This guarantees that each step t generates a set Ct such that ≻Ct is still a strict linear
order, i.e., such that Ct ∈ D.
Now for each step t, by Claim 1 we have
i∈N
SCOAi(xt)−

i∈N
SCOAi(yt) =

i∈N,p∈Ct−1
sAi(p)−

i∈N,p∈Ct
sAi(p),
and also, since ytPxt ∈ C and C ∈ FSCO(A1, ..., An), we have
i∈N
SCOAi(yt) ≤

i∈N
SCOAi(xt);
it follows that 
i∈N,p∈Ct−1
sAi(p)−

i∈N,p∈Ct
sAi(p) ≥ 0.
Summing this inequality over all steps t ∈ {1, ...,m}, we obtain
i∈N,p∈C0
sAi(p)−

i∈N,p∈Cm
sAi(p) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to the desired inequality (20) since C0 = C and Cm = C
′. 
Proof of Remark 2. Let s′ be deﬁned from reversal scoring s in the speciﬁed way.
Claim 1. s′ and s are equivalent.
Consider any proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn. I show for all C,D ∈ D that
i∈N,p∈C
sAi(p) ≥

i∈N,p∈D
sAi(p)⇔

i∈N,p∈C
s′Ai(p) ≥

i∈N,p∈D
s′Ai(p).
Consider any C,D ∈ D. I prove that ∆ ≥ 0⇔ ∆′ ≥ 0, where
∆ ≡

i∈N,p∈C
sAi(p)−

i∈N,p∈D
sAi(p) ≥ 0,
∆′ ≡

i∈N,p∈C
s′Ai(p)−

i∈N,p∈D
s′Ai(p) ≥ 0.
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We have
∆ =

i∈N



p∈C
sAi(p)−

p∈D
sAi(p)

 =

i∈N



p∈C\D
sAi(p)−

p∈D\C
sAi(p)

 .
So, noting that D\C = {¬p : p ∈ C\D}, we obtain
∆ =

i∈N

p∈C\D
(sAi(p)− sAi(¬p)).
By an analogous reasoning,
∆′ =

i∈N

p∈C\D
(s′Ai(p)− s′Ai(¬p)).
Hence, using the deﬁnition of s′,
∆′ =

i∈N

p∈C\D
([sAi(p)− sAi(¬p)]− [sAi(¬p)− sAi(p)])
= 2

i∈N

p∈C\D
(sAi(p)− sAi(¬p))
= 2∆.
So, ∆ ≥ 0⇔ ∆′ ≥ 0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. If X is the preference agenda, SCO is classical Borda scoring, A ∈ D, and
xPy ∈ X, then s′A(xPy) = SCOA(x)− SCOA(y).
Let X, SCO, A and xPy be as speciﬁed. If xPy ∈ A, then
s′(xPy) = s(xPy) by deﬁnition of s′
= SCOA(x)− SCOA(y) by Remark 1, as xPy ∈ A.
If xPy ∈ A, i.e., yPx ∈ A, then
s′(xPy) = −s(yPx) by deﬁnition of s′
= −(SCOA(y)− SCOA(x)) by Remark 1, as yPx ∈ A
= SCOA(x)− SCOA(y). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let X be the preference agenda for some set of alternatives
K of size k < ∞. Let srev , sdis and sirr be reversal, disjoint-entailment, and irreducible-
entailment scoring, respectively. Consider anyA ∈ D, denote the corresponding strict linear
order by ≻, let x1, ..., xk be the alternatives in the order given by xk ≻ xk−1 ≻ · · · ≻ x1,
and consider any p ∈ X, say p = xiPxi′ ∈ X.
Claim 1. srevA (p) = s
irr
A (p).
By the argument given in footnote 11, srevA (p) ≥ sdisA (p). I now show that sdisA (p) ≥
srevA (p). This inequality is trivial if p ∈ A, since then srevA (p) = 0 (as ¬p ∈ A). Now suppose
p ∈ A. By Remark 1, srevA (p) = i− i′. So we need to show that sdisA (p) ≥ i− i′. Consider
the i− i′ judgment subsets S1, ..., Si−i′ ⊆ A deﬁned as follows: for each j ∈ {1, ..., i− i′},
Sj ≡ {xiPxi−j , xi−jPxi′} ⊆ A,
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where Si−i′ is interpreted as the set {xiPxi′} (rather than the set {xiPxi′ , xi′Pxi′}, which
is not well-deﬁned since xi′Pxi′ is not a proposition in X). Since these judgment subsets
are pairwise disjoint and each of them entails p (= xiPxi′), we have s
dis
A (p) ≥ i− i′, q.e.d.
Claim 2. srevA (p) = s
irr
A (p).
If p ∈ A, then srevA (p) = sirrA (p) since srevA (p) = 0 (as ¬p ∈ A) and sirrA (p) = 0 (as A
does not entail p). Now suppose p ∈ A. Then, as already mentioned, srevA (p) = i − i′
by Remark 1. So we need to show that sirrA (p) = i − i′. As one may show, each of
the just-deﬁned sets S1, ..., Si−i′ irreducibly entails p (= xiPxi′). So it remains to show
that no other judgment subset irreducibly entails p. Suppose S ⊆ A irreducibly en-
tails p. I have to show that S ∈ {S1, ..., Si−i′}. As is easily checked, the set S ∪ {¬p}
(= S ∪ {xi′Pxi}) is minimal inconsistent. Hence, this set is cyclic, i.e., of the form
S ∪ {¬p} = {y1Py2, y2Py3, ..., ym−1Pym, ymPy1} for some m ≥ 2 and some distinct al-
ternatives y1, ..., ym ∈ K (see Dietrich and List 2010). Without loss of generality, assume
y1 = xi and ym = xi′ , so that ymPy1 = xi′Pxi and
S = {y1Py2, y2Py3, ..., ym−1Pym}.
If m = 2, then S = {y1Py2} = {xiPxi′}, which equals Si−i′ , and we are done. If m = 3,
then S = {y1Py2, y2Py3} = {xiPy2, y2Pxi′}. Since S is by assumption included in A,
it follows that A ranks y2 between xi and xi′ . So there is a j ∈ {1, ..., i − i′ − 1} such
that y2 = xi−j . Hence, S is the set {xiPxi−j , xi−jPxi′} = Sj , and we are done again.
Finally, m cannot exceed 3, since otherwise the set S (= {xiPy2, y2Py3, ..., ym−1Pxi′})
would entail p (= xiPxi′) non-irreducibly, since the set arising from S by replacing xiPy2
and y2Py3 with their implication xiPy3 still entails p. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any threshold family (mp)p∈X (∈ {1, ..., n}X), and de-
ﬁne scoring s by (11). Consider a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn for which C∗ ≡ F(mp)p∈X (A1, ...,
An) belongs to D. We have to show that Fs(A1, ..., An) = C∗. For each proposition p ∈ X,
writing the number of individuals accepting p as np ≡ |{i : p ∈ Ai}|, the sum-total score
of p is given by 
i∈N
sAi(p) =

i∈N:p∈Ai
(n+ 1−mp) +

i∈N:p∈Ai
(−mp)
= np(n+ 1−mp) + (n− np)(−mp)
= nnp + np − nmp.
= n(np −mp) + np;
and so, 
i∈N
sAi(p)

> 0 if np ≥ mp, i.e., if p ∈ C∗
< 0 if np < mp, i.e., if p ∈ C∗. (21)
Now we have {C∗} = argmaxC∈D

p∈C,i∈N sAi(p), because for each C ∈ D\{C∗},
p∈C∗,i∈N
sAi(p)−

p∈C,i∈N
sAi(p) =

p∈C∗\C

i∈N
sAi(p)
  
>0 by (21)
−

p∈C\C∗

i∈N
sAi(p)
  
<0 by (21)
> 0.
So, Fs(A1, ..., An) = {C∗} ≡ C∗. 
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Proof of Remark 4. Consider this X and P , let n be odd, and let s be scoring (13). I
write αpr for αpremise and αco for αconclusion. Whenever I consider a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈
Dn, I write Nt := {i : t ∈ Ai} for all t ∈ X, and I write MAJ , PRE, CON and SCO for
the outcome of majority rule, premise-based rule, conclusion-based rule, and the scoring
rule w.r.t. (13), respectively. Note that for all (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn the sum-total score of a
C = {p′, q′, r′} ∈ D (where p′ ∈ {p,¬p}, q′ ∈ {q,¬q} and r′ ∈ {r,¬r}) is given by
i∈N,t∈C
sAi(t) = (|Np′ |+ |Nq′ |)αpr + |Nr|αco. (22)
Claim 1. [PRE = SCO for all proﬁles in Dn] if and only if αpr > (n− 2)αco.
First, assume PRE = SCO for all proﬁle in Dn. As one may check, there is a proﬁle
such that |Np| = |Nq| = n+12 and |Nr| = 1. For this proﬁle, PRE = {p, q, r}. So,
SCO = {p, q, r}. Hence, the sum-total score of {p, q, r} exceeds that of {¬p, q,¬r}. By
(22), these two sum-total scores can be written, respectively, as
i∈N,t∈{p,q,r}
sAi(t) =
n+ 1
2
αpr +
n+ 1
2
αpr + αco = (n+ 1)αpr + αco

i∈N,t∈{¬p,q,¬r}
sAi(t) =
n− 1
2
αpr +
n+ 1
2
αpr + (n− 1)αco = nαpr + (n− 1)αco.
Hence,
(n+ 1)αpr + αco > nαpr + (n− 1)αco,
or equivalently, αpr > (n− 2)αco.
Conversely, assume αpr > (n − 2)αco. Consider any proﬁle. We have to show that
PRE = SCO.
Case 1 : MAJ ∈ D. Check that it follows that PRE =MAJ , and also that SCO =
MAJ . So, PRE = SCO.
Case 2 : MAJ ∈ D. Check that it follows that MAJ = {p, q,¬r}. Hence PRE =
{p, q, r}. We thus have to show that SCO = {p, q, r}, i.e., that
∆1 ≡

i∈N,t∈{p,q,r}
sAi(t)−

i∈N,t∈{¬p,q,¬r}
sAi(t) > 0
∆2 ≡

i∈N,t∈{p,q,r}
sAi(t)−

i∈N,t∈{p,¬q,¬r}
sAi(t) > 0
∆3 ≡

i∈N,t∈{p,q,r}
sAi(t)−

i∈N,t∈{¬p,¬q,¬r}
sAi(t) > 0.
By (22),
∆1 = (|Np| − |N¬p|)αpr + (|Nr| − |N¬r|)αco = (2 |Np| − n)αpr + (2 |Nr| − n)αco. (23)
In this, as p ∈ MAJ we have |Np| ≥ (n+ 1)/2; and further, as p, q ∈ MAJ the sets Np
and Nq each contain a majority, so that Np ∩Nq = ∅, which (since Np ∩Nq ⊆ Nr) implies
|Nr| ≥ 1. Using these lower bounds for |Np| and |Nr|, we obtain
∆1 ≥ ((n+ 1)− n)αpr + (2− n)αco = αpr + (2− n)αco > 0.
The proof that ∆2 > 0 is analogous. Finally, by (22),
∆3 = (|Np| − |N¬p|)αpr + (|Nq| − |N¬q|)αpr + (|Nr| − |N¬r|)αco.
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Since |Nq| > |N¬q| (since q ∈MAJ ), it follows using (23) that ∆3 > ∆2, and hence, that
∆3 > 0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. [CON = SCO for all proﬁles in Dn] if and only if αco > αpr = 0.
Unlike in the proof of Claim, there may be ties, and so we treat CON and SCO
as subsets of D, not elements. First, if αco > αpr = 0, then it is easy to show that
CON = SCO for each proﬁle. Conversely, suppose it is not the case that αco > αpr =
0. Then either αco = αpr = 0 or αpr > 0. In the ﬁrst case, clearly CON = SCO
for some proﬁles, since SCO is always D. In the second case, again CON = SCO for
some proﬁles: for instance, if each individual submits ¬pq¬r then SCO = {¬pq¬r} while
CON = {¬pq¬r, p¬q¬r,¬p¬q¬r}. 
Proof of Proposition 6. It will sometimes be convenient to write a vectorD = (D1, ...,Dn)
∈ Rn as +Di,. The mean and variance of this vector D are denoted and deﬁned by, respec-
tively,
D ≡ 1
n

i∈N
Di and V ar(D) ≡ 1
n

i∈N
(Di −D)2.
In this notation, the average square deviation of a constant c ∈ R from the components in
D is +(c−Di)2, and satisﬁes
+(c−Di)2, = (c−D)2 + V ar(D), (24)
by the following argument borrowed from statistics:
+(c−Di)2, =

(c−D +D−Di)2

=

(c−D)2 + 2(c−D)(D −Di) + (D −Di)2

= (c−D)2 + 2(c−D)D−Di+ (D−Di)2
= (c−D)2 + 0 + V ar(D).
Now consider any scoring s and let the set scoring σ be deﬁned by (16). Consider any
proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈ Dn and any C ∈ D. Under σ, the sum-total score of C can be written
as 
i∈N
σAi(C) = −

i∈N
Cs −Asi2
= −

i∈N

p∈X
(Csp −Asip)2
= −n

p∈X
1
n

i∈N
(Csp −Asip)2.
Here, the inner expression can be re-expressed as
1
n

i∈N
(Csp −Asip)2 =

(Csp −Asip)2

= (Csp −

Asip

)2 + V ar(

Asip

),
where the last equality applies (24) with c = Csp and D =

Asip

. It follows that
i∈N
σAi(C) = −n

p∈X

(Csp −

Asip

)2 + V ar(

Asip

)

= −n

p∈X
(Csp −

Asip

)2 + d (for some d independent of C)
= −n
C − +Asi ,2 + d.
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Maximizing this expression w.r.t. C ∈ D is equivalent to minimizing its strictly decreasing
transformation
C − +Asi , w.r.t. C ∈ D. So, the set scoring rule w.r.t. σ delivers the
same collective judgment set(s) C as the average-score rule w.r.t. s. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume (IND) and (COM) and consider a proﬁle (A1, ..., An) ∈
Dn.
Firstly, using (IND), the likelihood of the proﬁle given C ∈ D can be written as
Pr(A1, ..., An|T ) =

i∈N
Pr(Ai|T ).
Maximizing this expression (w.r.t. T ∈ D) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm,
i∈N
logPr(Ai|T ),
which is precisely the sum-total score of T under set scoring (17).
Secondly, writing π for the proﬁle’s probability Pr(A1, ..., An), the posterior probability
of T ∈ D given the proﬁle can be written as
Pr(T |A1, ..., An) = 1
π
Pr(T )Pr(A1, ..., An|T ) = 1
π
Pr(T )

i∈N
Pr(Ai|T ).
Maximizing this expression (w.r.t. T ∈ D) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm, and
hence, to maximizing
logPr(T ) +

i∈N
logPr(Ai|T ) =

i∈N
(logPr(Ai|T ) + 1
n
log Pr(T )),
which is the sum-total score of T under set scoring (18). 
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